PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS IN DISPUTES CONCERNING LAWYERS' FEES AND THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

Abstract

The present investigation is derived from Art. 333 of the COGEP, which prohibits appeals and appeals in fact in processes related to the collection of fees between lawyers and clients. This prohibition implies that these processes are of a single instance, therefore, the sentences issued in these cases are final and definitive, without the possibility of being challenged, they acquire the character of res judicata, both material and formal. On the other hand, Article 153 of the COGEP regulates the preliminary objections in a legal proceeding. Some of these exceptions may be definitive and put an end to the process, such as the statute of limitations, lapse of time or res judicata. The judge's decision on preliminary objections may be appealed during the same hearing. If a preliminary objection that cannot be cured is accepted, the appeal is granted with suspensive effect. If the preliminary objection is rejected, the appeal is granted with deferred effect. It would be unacceptable not to allow an appeal of the judgment in a professional fee suit, but to allow an appeal of the order rejecting a prior objection. The objective is to determine to what extent prohibiting appeal violates the right to appeal. The methodology applied to the research is qualitative and theoretical-descriptive. It was concluded that there is a significant legal vacuum that violates due process.  Key words: Lawyers, professional fees, legal certainty, due process, double compliance, right to appeal.